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New Foundations for Ecological Economics 
 
Clive L. Spash1,2 
 
Abstract 
Ecological economics has been repeatedly described as transdisciplinary and open to 
including everything from positivism to relativism. I argue for a revision and rejection of this 
position in favour of realism and reasoned critique. Looking into the ontological 
presuppositions and considering an epistemology appropriate for ecological economics to 
meaningfully exist requires rejecting the form of methodological pluralism which has been 
advocated since the start of this journal. This means being clear about the differences in our 
worldview (or paradigm) from others and being aware of the substantive failures of orthodox 
economics in addressing reality. This paper argues for a fundamental review of the basis 
upon which ecological economics has been founded and in so doing seeks improved clarity as 
to the competing and complementary epistemologies and methodologies. In part this requires 
establishing serious interdisciplinary research to replace superficial transdisciplinary rhetoric. 
The argument places the future of ecological economics firmly amongst heterodox economic 
schools of thought and in ideological opposition to those supporting the existing institutional 
structures perpetuating a false reality of the world's social, environmental and economic 
systems and their operation. 
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1. Introduction 
Early on, in the modern history of ecological economics, both Costanza (1996) and Daly 
(1991) appealed directly to Schumpeter's preanalytic approach as something which should 
inform the new movement, and in so doing both quoted the same paragraph of his History of 
Economic Analysis (Schumpeter, 1994 [1954]: 42, paragraph two).  This shows early 
recognition of the need to clarify what is ontologically different about ecological economics 
and where its key concerns might lie.  However, the project seems to have stalled at birth as 
no distinct set of coherent phenomena appeared, nor currently can be readily identified, as 
forming the basis of our analytical efforts.  This seems to be due to the readiness to accept 
diversity at the cost of coherence, but more generally, to the lack of theoretical underpinning 
provided after the initial establishment of the society and journal. 
In the first issue of this journal, ecological economics was defined by Costanza (1989: 
1) as including neoclassical environmental economics and ecological impact studies, as well 
as encouraging new ways of thinking.  The name was taken to signify an “interdisciplinary, 
and holistic view”, although soon Costanza (1991, 1996) strongly advocated 
transdisciplinarity.  The journal was stated to be pursuing “a strategy of pluralism”, which 
was left for definition, in that first issue, by Norgaard (1989) under the title of 
"methodological pluralism".  That article remains one of the few attempts to explore the 
philosophy of science behind ecological economics.  Norgaard discussed a specific form of 
positivist epistemology in economics and ecology and concluded this could neither be 
accepted as 'the' way ahead, due to its flaws, nor rejected, due to the practical consideration of 
its dominance in economics.  I will question this argument and conclusion while clarifying 
the role and meaning of positivism.  I will also argue against the all encompassing pluralism 
which has been advocated ever since, not least because of the resulting incoherence and 
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brushing over of fundamental conflicts between different worldviews and the need to 
question the validity of those views in light of reality. 
The first introductory book (Costanza et al., 1998), by leading American figures in the 
society, maintained an uneasy balance between requesting a new worldview, to address our 
social and environmental woes, and not ejecting the body of orthodox thinking.  Daly, as a 
co-author of that book, appears to have later developed a seemingly more radical position.  
The introductory textbook by Daly and Farley (2004) invokes the concepts of both a new 
preanalytic vision for economics and a Kuhnian revolutionary change.  At one point Daly and 
Farley propose rejection of a value basis in subjective preferences and deride pluralism.  
They state: "we must have a dogmatic belief in objective value, an objective hierarchy of 
ends ordered with reference to some concept of ultimate end" (Daly and Farley, 2004: 42).1  
However, this lacks explanation and, elsewhere, they call upon what they have attacked (e.g. 
marginal analysis, utilitarian explanations, mainstream models and concepts), and are happy 
to endorse tradable permits markets as consistent with ecological economic principles.  Their 
main message is then that scale and distribution must be addressed prior to the pursuit of 
efficiency.  The other main introductory text has no revolutionary claims to make but rather 
falls back on standard orthodox economic theory and methodology (Common and Stagl, 
2005).  This includes using the same philosophy of science (a form of logical empiricism) 
and ethical theory (utilitarianism) as associated with neoclassical economics.  Such a position 
seems to ally ecological economics closely with mainstream environmental and resource 
economics.  On the basis of such books, perhaps we should not then be surprised by Ehrlich 
(2008: 1) stating that he regards environmental and resource economics as identical to 
ecological economics, or that the Journal of Economic Literature classifies ecological 
economics under "Q5 - Environmental Economics".2 
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Such misclassifications are possible because ecological economists have not 
themselves made a sufficient stand as to where the differences lie.  A keyword search of this 
journal covering 3402 articles gives one result for ontology (Baumgartner and Quaas, 2010), 
and four for epistemology (Baumgartner et al., 2001; Bromley, 2008; Mayumi, 1997; 
O'Connor, 2000).  Lack of attention to the theoretical foundations of ecological economics 
has left it in a precarious and epistemologically confused position.  Faber (2008: 4), in 
bemoaning the fragility of ecological economics, states: "a generally accepted theoretical 
framework or methodology has yet to be defined".  Similarly, Røpke (2005) has argued that 
the knowledge base is not well structured nor systematically organised, and that the identity 
of the field is weak.  The conflict between a proposed new outlook and reliance on existing 
economic theory and methods leaves authors visibly struggling in their attempts to reconcile 
the differences. 
The contention of this paper is that ecological economics requires solid foundations in 
the philosophy of science to clarify how natural and social sciences can cooperate and the 
extent to which they can combine in a way which meaningfully advances knowledge.  
Ecological economics must clarify its position on such issues as the use of mathematical 
formalism, the role of empiricism and the meaning of pluralism.  A distinct and radical 
synthesis is called for in order to establish new foundations.  This can be seen as relating to 
various calls for developing a preanalytic vision (Costanza, 1996; Costanza et al., 1998; Daly, 
1991; Daly and Farley, 2004; Munda, 1997; Ӧzkaynak et al., 2002).  In doing so, we should 
not be afraid to articulate our ideological positions (Söderbaum, 1999).  Indeed, as 
Schumpeter (1994 [1954]) explained, this is to be expected in the formation of a new or 
innovative development in economic thought. 
In conducting this discussion I hope to be more precise than the seminal paper by 
Norgaard (1989) because he confuses, fails to address or fails to clarify the differences 
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between ontology, epistemology and methodology, between methodological and value 
pluralism, and between diversity in methods as opposed to methodologies.  Epistemology 
(from the Greek episteme, meaning knowledge) concerns the theoretical basis on which we 
create understanding of the world.  This involves theories about the origin and limits of 
knowledge.  It describes how we can form knowledge about the world and what is the 
meaning of truly knowing something.  What comes prior to how we can know is the 
metaphysical (ontological) question of what exists, and so what are the primary entities of 
concern in any given field, and what are their most general features and relationships.  What 
comes after is methodology.  The tools of scientific investigation form the methods and the 
term method should not be confused with or used as shorthand for methodology (as is too 
often done).  Methodology concerns the principles that determine how such tools are 
deployed and interpreted.  Methodology is used in two senses referring to (i) the principles 
and practices that underlie research in a discipline or subject area, and (ii) the appropriateness 
of the methods.  This requires general principles about the formation of knowledge in 
practice and so becomes interrelated with the theory of knowledge (i.e., epistemology); in 
economics, methodology is often used as synonymous with epistemology.  Overall we can 
simplify the philosophy of science as a progression from ontology to epistemology to 
methodology to methods. 
This paper does not pretend to be definitive but rather aims to provide some 
theoretical reflections about the type of ontology, epistemology and methodology which 
appear most suited to such an interdisciplinary enterprise as ecological economics.  Next, in 
Section 2, the background to epistemological confusion in ecological economics is explained 
as deriving from a misinterpretation of logical empiricism and its role in economics.  This has 
led to arguments simultaneously attacking positivism in general while arguing for its 
inclusion alongside conflicting epistemologies under a supposed pluralism.  Understanding 
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this confusion requires placing positivism and logical empiricism in context and explaining 
the development of the latter and its role in economics.  This also provides some introduction 
to key aspects of an empirical epistemology which should inform ecological economics.  
Section 3 follows this discussion with the case against the existing form of methodological 
pluralism in ecological economics.  Section 4 moves on to explore the concept and meaning 
of a preanalytic vision and pursues this in the context of refining an ontology and 
epistemology for ecological economics.  Section 5 brings the discussion together via a set of 
tentative propositions on ontology, epistemology, methodology and ideology.  The overall 
aim is to initiate a debate within ecological economics as to its meaning and future direction. 
2. Epistemology in Science and Economics: Positivism and Logical Empiricism 
In economics, standard undergraduate texts start by distinguishing positive (value free) 
economics from the normative (value laden); the is/ought dichotomy going back to Hume.  
The former is generally regarded as the 'scientific' branch, and the division is one which 
claims facts are separable from values.  Furthermore, the implication is that positive 
economics can establish causal relationships as true in an objective sense, i.e. which nobody 
could logically deny. 
Norgaard (1989: 51) has argued that ecological economics should include the 
dominant methodology in economics, which he believes is logical positivism.  He claims that 
adopting an alternative would exclude "nearly all of economics".  Simultaneously, he is 
highly critical of the approach and advocates a conflicting historical descriptive methodology, 
with reference to the German historical school.3  More recently, Söderbaum (2011: 1019) has 
stated that "there will certainly be a role for positivism also in the future", although he then 
proposes social constructivism and hermeneutics, as better able to aid our understanding of 
sustainability policy.  These types of 'pluralist' proposals leave unanswered how such 
divergent and conflicting approaches are to be made compatible.  The implication is that 
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ecological economics needs positivism even if supplemented, but what exactly is being 
recommended? 
Positivism and Logical Empiricism 
Positivism was a product of the Enlightenment, founded as a system of thought by Auguste 
Comte (1798–1857) after having been secretary to Henri de Saint-Simon (1760-1825) and a 
student at the École Polytechnique (from 1814-1816) at the time of teachers such as Pierre-
Simon Laplace (1749-1827).  Comte's positivism did not separate philosophy of science from 
political philosophy (Bourdeau, 2011).  However, during the 19th Century positivism 
developed away from its originator’s ideas and became associated with an objective non-
political foundation for science on the basis of using observation.  Observation as a personal 
experience also connects positivism with the earlier philosophy of David Hume (1711-1776) 
and his empiricism (i.e. use of the senses).  Scientific positivism combined with mechanism 
can be seen as having informed some basic positions in mainstream economics.  Norgaard 
(1987, 1994b) has been highly critical of such 19th Century thought and its attributes—
universalism, atomism, monism—and like Georgescu-Roegen (2009 [1979]) has rejected a 
mechanistic epistemology in economics on what amount to realist and ontological grounds. 
In the 20th Century logical empiricism arose in response to new developments in 
physics.  This distinct development was a modernist movement combining a logical 
analytical approach for framing propositions about the world with the requirement for 
empirical testing of those propositions.  Logical empiricism was strongly developed in 
Austria and Germany, during the 1920s and 1930s, and most notably advanced by the 
scholars of the Vienna Circle (see Appendix I), before spreading more widely and dominating 
philosophy of science over several decades.  Some, especially economists, refer to this as 
logical positivism, although this terminology was little used by the Circle and tends to 
represent a specific narrow characterisation (Uebel, 2011).  The term logical empiricism is 
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more general and inclusive (Creath, 2011).  Unfortunately Norgaard's (1989) coverage skips 
past 20th Century debates and developments in logical empiricism and is inaccurate in several 
respects.4  He follows the modern tendency to deride logical empiricism as imposing a 
narrow dogmatism as to proper scientific conduct. 
Characterisation of logical empiricism as a united, anti-pluralist school of thought is 
certainly misleading.  There were important divisions within the movement and substantive 
changes in positions over time. 5  Various forms of pluralism were also present in the ideas of 
key members.6  Clearly ecological economics is in part an empirically based body of 
knowledge and cannot ignore the form and meaning of observational investigation which it 
accepts as valid or the role it attributes to scientific investigation.  So learning from logical 
empiricism seems important.  Key common aspects of the approach were a rejection of 
metaphysics, unifying science, and establishing a criterion of validity and a scientific 
methodology.  Each is addressed in turn. 
Logical empiricism is associated with an approach which rejected metaphysics (e.g. 
ontology) as unscientific.  Logically metaphysics was deemed meaningless for creating 
scientific knowledge because it did not conform to experimental verification.  For the left 
wing of the Circle rejection of metaphysics was also politically driven, because the 
totalitarianism of the time made use of pseudo-scientific claims which they felt scientific 
truth seeking could expose and avoid (Creath, 2011).  Unscientific metaphysical ways of 
thinking were regarded as entrapping people in anti-Semitism, racial hatred, sexism, 
homophobia and so on.  Articulating and defending a scientific worldview was then both an 
academic position and a political act aimed at social reform and emancipation. 
From the logical analytical perspective a stress on observability led to a unity of 
science position.  Some took this to mean that all knowledge about nature could be expressed 
in a single language.  However, for those on the Circle’s left wing, this also had a political 
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pluralist and social reformist character because empiricism would reveal grounds for 
reasonable disagreement and absence of dominant solutions; unity of science could then be 
linked to improved communication and public participation (O'Neill, 2003).  It also related to 
internationalism as an aim of Marxism.  In this way the logical and analytical advances being 
made were complementary to a socialist political agenda.  At the same time theoretical 
advances in analytical philosophy could be made independently of this political agenda. 
On the Circle's analytical agenda were the grounds for validating a proposition as 
true.  Some logical empiricists, following Ernst Mach, argued for complete verification by 
observational evidence as the criterion of validity.7  Verifiability proved problematic because 
it rules out as meaningless certain statements of universal form, which are often used in the 
specification of general scientific laws, as not being conclusively verifiable.  One exception 
could falsify them, and no number of confirming instances can guarantee that such an 
exception will never be found (e.g. all Swans are white until you observe a black one).  Such 
criticism is often associated with Karl Popper, although self-criticism was prevalent within 
the Circle.  Popper regarded the idea of consciously and constantly trying to falsify a 
hypotheses as the essence of the scientific methodology for establishing provisionally true 
laws.  However, as Popper later realised, falsification also proves problematic for a number 
of reasons (see Caldwell, 1991). 
One alternative to both verifiability and falsifiability is 'confirmability'.  Confidence 
that a test accurately confirms, or disconfirms, a hypothesis requires that initial test 
conditions and auxiliary hypotheses should be finite in number, empirically specifiable, 
technologically realizable and met.  These conditions are virtually impossible to fulfil, 
especially in the social sciences  As Caldwell (1980: 65) notes: "Thus, paradoxically, a 
number of auxiliary hypotheses may be implicit in any test situation, but their presence can 
go undetected until they fail to hold".  The role and importance of auxiliary concepts were 
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recognised early on in the Circle by Otto Neurath and Philipp Frank (O'Neill and Uebel, 
2004: 91).  Their presence implies choice between competing hypothesis cannot be made on 
purely logical or empirical grounds.  Neurath in particular wrote on the conditional nature of 
all science and the sociological dimensions of the acceptance of knowledge claims (Uebel, 
1996: 92). 
Another contested area was the allowance of non-observable phenomena, and so 
metaphysics.  Rejection of metaphysical concepts means being unable to address statements 
which make reference to non-observable theoretical entities (e.g. at the time atoms).  Yet 
science posits the existence of such things.  One solution is then to only test systems of 
thought, while allowing non-observables as part of such systems.  More formally, the 
structure of a theory (a hypothetico-deductive system) contains axioms (primitives) which 
may refer to non-observable entities and theorems (derivatives).  All terms gain 
meaningfulness to the extent that the theory as a whole is confirmed, usually by checking the 
derivative theorems (or predictions) against evidence. 
The overall development of logical empiricism has elements which space precludes 
covering (e.g. the role of probability), and it contained diverse opinions.  However, some 
significant aspects of a main synthesis of its mature formulation might be summarised as 
follows.  First, individual statements contained in a theory were not to be tested separately; 
rather, an entire theory was to be tested to see if its observable deduced consequences 
corresponded to reality.  Second, confirmability became the criterion of cognitive 
significance.  Third, there was no need to worry about whether theoretical terms made 
reference to real entities (the realist-instrumentalist controversy); what counted was whether 
the hypotheses which contained them could be confirmed.  Yet, even this formulation of 
logical empiricism faces serious problems.  There exists no sharp distinction between what is 
observable and what is not.  Thus, any observation requires both selection and interpretation 
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by the observer and theory may become intertwined with fact (Caldwell, 1980).  The 
objectivity of science can then be challenged, and this line of reasoning supports a 
postmodern critique leading to the belief that all reality is relative to the observer 
(relativisim). 
However, Neurath for one was aware of such failings and came to reject all three 
standard accounts of scientific methodology—falsification, induction and confirmation.  He 
recognised that choice enters at various levels in framing any test for compatibility between a 
hypothesis-system and the data/facts.  Systematically different choices lead to different 
systems of understanding.  Neurath therefore came to believe that no datum could falsify a 
system of hypotheses, they could only shake one's confidence in it.  He accepted that 
additional social and political criteria were necessary to judge between competing hypotheses 
(Cartwright and Cat, 1996: 84-85).8 
In summary, logical empiricism evolved as a distinct approach to scientific 
understanding which strongly diverged from 19th Century positivism.  There were competing 
forms of logical empiricism and distinct groupings within the Vienna Circle.  Common 
derogatory characterisation is a misrepresentation of diversity and self-criticism within the 
Circle.9  This brief overview should make clear that logical empiricism cannot be easily 
dismissed and certainly not on the basis of simplified caricatures.  It was responsible for 
many advances in epistemology.  At the same time the empiricism of ecological economics 
must be aware of the pitfalls logical empiricism exposed and cannot simply follow 
mainstream economics.  In actual fact, what form of epistemology—19th Century positivism, 
a form of logical empiricism or something else—is extant in economics today is far from 
clear, as will be explained next. 
Epistemology in Economics 
 12
Hutchinson (1938) has been attributed with first introducing a form of logical empiricism into 
economics (Caldwell, 1980).  The desire for economics to be a science, in the mode of 
physics, meant the rhetoric of logical empiricism spread even if its actual practice did not.  
Elements of this persist today.  The promise of empirical testing explains why experimental 
approaches have been on the rise.  The belief in observation, as a key to finding the truth, 
supports the popularity of behavioural theories (e.g. if things such as emotions cannot be 
observed they are inappropriate subjects for scientific investigation).  Yet logical empiricism 
is far from having dominated economics in practice. 
Indeed, there has been much variety in economics concerning both empirical practice 
and the appropriate epistemological approach.  There is Friedman’s (1953) widely cited, but 
muddled and confused (Pheby, 1988: 88), essay in which he advocates the primacy of 
prediction in testing theories and denigrates the role of explanation.  There is the early 1960s 
discussion of this, in the American Economic Review, where Samuelson attacked Friedman 
and others.  Caldwell (1980: 70) describes Samuelson’s contribution as “advocacy of the 
nineteenth-century view of explanation” with regards to positivism, and notes that this 
“obfuscated all intelligible discussion” in economic methodology for decades. 
This neglect of epistemology undoubtedly led to further mixed practices and was not 
reversed until the 1980s.  At this time Blaug (1980) attacked the prevalence of verification as 
opposed to falsification in economics, although what he described as “measurement without 
theory” hardly conformed to a verifiability principle.  He noted the state of affairs as follows:  
“The journals abound with papers that apply regression analysis to every conceivable 
economic problem, but it is no secret that success in such endeavours frequently relies 
on “cookbook econometrics”: express a hypothesis in terms of an equation, estimate a 
variety of forms for that equation, select the best fit, discard the rest, and then adjust 
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the theoretical arguments to rationalise the hypothesis that is being tested” (Blaug, 
1980: 256-257). 
This shows employment of auxiliary hypotheses at its worst.  A situation which appears 
unchanged. 
This pseudo-logical empiricist approach is today backed-up by claims of rigour in 
theorising based on the ever increasing reliance on mathematical formalism.  This monist 
method also makes for monist methodology by discouraging variety (Dow, 2007).  Yet, 
McCloskey (1983: 484) has described the 'official' methodological approach as combining 
“an amalgam of logical positivism, behaviorism, operationalism, and the hypothetico-
deductive model of science”.  While the 'official' discourse conforms to formalism, in terms 
of a particular range of mathematical techniques for formulating theory and assessing 
evidence, every day practice relies on a much wider range of approaches to argumentation.  
She has therefore put forward the case for economics being nothing more than rhetoric, and 
proposed that it adopt serious study of this form of reasoning and persuasion as its 
methodological approach. 
In contrast, Blaug (1980) has argued for the adoption of a falsification approach he 
attributes to Popper.  His formulation introduces a highly prescriptive epistemological 
principle which instructs how science should be conducted, and provides rules for the 
demarcation of what counts as science (or in this case economics).  Thus, proposing axioms 
which are claimed to be true but cannot be falsified is deemed unscientific.  Note this 
criticism of making infallible claims would apply to Daly and Farley (2004) who recognise 
they are being dogmatic in their assertion of objective hierarchical values and an unknowable 
ultimate end.  Of course this is also how prescriptive criteria are used to dismiss alternative 
modes of thought. 
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Falsification is actually hard to achieve in a social science such as economics and 
suffers various problems, which Popper himself recognised as relevant even for the natural 
sciences.  Bromley (2008: 8), writing in Ecological Economics, has incorrectly criticised 
Popper in this regard.  The American Pragmatist approach advocated by Bromley (2008: 9) 
argues for criticism, which he refers to as "a gauntlet of hostile challenges".10  Popper himself 
advocated 'critical rationalism' as underpinning his use of falsification as a principle, and in 
later life developed his ontology to recognise the prevalence of complex open systems and 
differences between physical and social reality (Lawson, 2008).  Critical rationalism argues 
for sometimes evaluating a theory on strict empirical falsification grounds, but allows at other 
times, especially for the social sciences, for criticising a theory by applying logic or other 
methods.  This opens the door for metaphysical theories as long as they can be rationally 
criticised, although the form and role of criticism then becomes contentious (Caldwell, 1991). 
In this regard, an interesting development is the introduction of critical realism to 
economics (Archer et al., 1998; Fleetwood, 1999; Lawson, 1997).  This posits the existence 
of an objective reality that is knowable and can be described, whilst accepting that all 
knowledge claims are fallible.  Critical realists have pointed out that economics hides and 
avoids discussing its ontology and, in fact, assumes one implicitly in its epistemology (the 
epistemic fallacy).11  In addition, they note that failing to address the nature of existence and 
assuming event regularities, which rarely occur in the social realm, means economic 
forecasters (econometricians) cannot forecast accurately, and economic theorists using 
deduction are unable to illuminate us.  Critical realists in economics conclude that social 
explanation is possible but only if we move away from the deductivist methodology.  As 
Lawson (1997: 36), a major advocate, states: "Specifically, social explanation, appropriately 
conceived, is not the attempted deduction of events from sets of individual conditions and 
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constant-conjunction 'laws', but identification and illumination of structures and/or 
mechanisms responsible for producing, or facilitating, social phenomena of interest." 
So within economics there is actually methodological diversity and some recognition 
of the necessity for reasoned critique.  This is hard to discern because the mainstream appears 
highly prescriptive and restrictive in its ever increasing reliance on mathematical formalism 
as a monist methodology.  In practice there is mixed application of and attention to the 
strictures of empiricism, and substantive variety in methodology across schools of economic 
thought.  Post Keynesians, neo-Marxists, critical institutionalists and feminists each have a 
somewhat different approach.  Within each school there may be reliance on a range of 
different methods on the grounds that no one method is sufficient, something Dow (2007) 
refers to as pluralist methodology (not to be confused with methodological pluralism).  She 
notes that these methods must be incommensurate, otherwise they would collapse into one 
method.  Explicit adoption of this type of methodology typifies heterodox economics.  The 
question for ecological economics is then on what grounds it should remain open to various 
methodologies, including those advocated by mainstream economists. 
3. The Case Against Methodological Pluralism 
Transdisciplinarity and methodological pluralism have been taken as core ideas by many in 
ecological economics, but with the apparent result that serious attention to theoretical 
contradiction has been lacking.  At the core of Norgaard's argument for methodological 
pluralism is his belief that “a diversity of methodologies is appropriate and pressures to 
eliminate methodologies for the sake of conformity should be avoided” (1989: 37).  
However, this is an argument against prescriptive epistemology not the elimination of some 
methodologies per se.  Intellectual progress requires understanding built-on deciding what 
contributes to knowledge or, as Norgaard (1989: 38) admits, “the intellectual environment we 
create to sort the good from the bad”.  He is highly critical of specific epistemological 
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features—unity of science, universal laws, independence of reality from observer and 
culture—and he clearly favours their rejection from any epistemology for ecological 
economics (see also Norgaard, 1994a).  Furthermore, Norgaard (1989: 38) explicitly criticises 
both ecologists and economists for their adherence to such a prescriptive methodology as 
"logical positivism", and states he is in “opposition to this long-standing belief in a right way 
of knowing and precise prediction”.  Of course in doing so he is unwittingly offering another 
“right way of knowing”.  In any case, his point does not seem to be that all methodologies 
can be regarded as equally valid or acceptable. 
Yet, Norgaard (1989: 44) then claims that: “In fact, few scientists study methodology 
or make their beliefs explicit.  Individual scientists, and eventually whole disciplines, succeed 
by being pragmatic”.  Later he concludes that "logical positivism is inappropriate but 
necessary", and it is necessary "because modern people perceive science in terms of 
objective, universal truths" (Norgaard, 1989: 51).12  So ecological economists must 
apparently accept arguing on the same grounds!  This amounts to recommending 
methodology on the basis of presumed popularity and fails to address the critical 
epistemological concerns and realist arguments he himself has raised. 
Despite this poor foundation, the idea of an uncritical pluralism has spread within 
ecological economics and been promoted at the highest levels.  Ecological economists 
Costanza, Perrings and Cleveland represent between them two former editors of the journal 
and two former international society presidents.  In their combined opinion: “Ecological 
economics is necessarily eclectic and pluralistic.  It is therefore difficult to pin down and 
summarize.” (Costanza et al., 1997: xiii).  Acceptance of this as the natural order of things 
seems to condemn ecological economics to ultimate irrelevance.  As Dow (2007: 448) states 
"unstructured pluralism or eclecticism, understood as an absence of selection criteria, or 
“anything goes”, is antithetical to the building up of knowledge".  In addition, a belief in 
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some objective reality (as opposed to a strong social constructivist position) adds further 
restrictions.  As Dow (2007: 455) goes on to remark: "There is a limit to how far there can be 
plurality of understandings of the nature of reality, approaches to knowledge, and meaning, 
when knowledge needs to be developed within groups of researchers and communicated to 
others. Plurality in practice cannot be infinite." 
The need to save ecological economics from an “arbitrary openness to just 
everything” is recognised by Baumgartner et al. (2008).  Although their discussion still 
claims an epistemological plurality to support plurality in the use of methods.  Besides being 
unnecessary, there is a problem in proposing multiple epistemologies without any synthesis.  
This is the simple impossibility of simultaneously holding two (or more?) contradictory ways 
of understand the meaning of knowledge.  Indeed, under epistemology, they actually end-up 
arguing for a social constructivist position, although without making clear if this is strong or 
weak.13  They also state the need for a unified methodological basis which needs to be 
consistent with and systematically directed towards the subject matter and aims of ecological 
economics (Baumgartner et al., 2008).  Some of their suggestions in this area are potentially 
progressive.14  However, they seem to fall foul of the epistemic fallacy, never address the 
ontological foundations of ecological economics and so miss the opportunity to provide some 
foundational basis for the argument.  Yet the thrust of their position is clearly that structuring 
epistemology and methodology in ecological economics is necessary for progress. 
Dow (2007) argues for "structured pluralism" which she sees as the need for 
structured methodological approaches within schools of thought and communication across 
them.  This is basically the same approach as proposed much earlier in the context of 
environmental economics and policy by Söderbaum (1990) under the title of "paradigmatic 
pluralism".  Like Norgaard, whom he cites, Söderbaum wants to be inclusive, even of 
mainstream economists' ideas, but this tolerance rather conflicts with his assessment of their 
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school of thought and its mode of operation.  His arguments for being open-minded and 
respectful of others' ideas are clear enough, but why then include ideas regarded as creating 
intolerance and submit to the institutions spreading those ideas?  In this regard the 
mainstream of economics appears as the antithesis of his approach.  As he states: "For 
instance, mainstream economists tend to use their power positions to build cartels and to 
discriminate against all kinds of economists who represent a threat to orthodoxy" 
(Söderbaum, 1990: 482).  He also believes, on what appear to be ontological grounds, that 
institutional economics is a better approach for addressing environmental problems.  His 
reasons for suggesting that fruitful dialogue might be possible between those holding 
orthodox and heterodox economic ideas become increasingly incredulous given the following 
concluding remarks: 
"As I see it, neoclassical environmental economists are wasting scarce intellectual and 
financial resources by trying to do what is impossible or not meaningful." 
(Söderbaum, 1990: 490) 
"In my experiences, the problem here is that many neoclassical environmental 
economists are more eager to save their theories and methods than to improve the 
chances of human survival on this planet." (Söderbaum, 1990: 491) 
Elsewhere he has also been highly critical of neoclassical economics (Söderbaum, 1992) and 
referred to cost-benefit analysis as incompatible with democracy (Söderbaum, 1999: 162). 
Here then is the conundrum for methodological pluralists.  They must either 
indiscriminately accept everything, and so lose any meaning for the concept of knowledge, or 
accept some grounds for rejecting ideas and approaches which they find strongly 
objectionable.  As Söderbaum (1990) notes, the heterodox are normally versed in the 
mainstream while the reverse is rare, that is the orthodox are closed-minded.  So 
communication across heterodox schools seems a more reasonable way ahead.  For example, 
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linking with institutional economics, especially in the critical mode of Kapp (1970, 1976) and 
Myrdal (1978), has been suggested by Söderbaum (1992, 2000) and several other ecological 
economists (Munda, 1997; Røpke, 1998; Spash, 2009b; Spash and Villena, 1999; Vatn, 
2005). 
More generally, discourse, deliberation and effective criticism are aided if there are 
some grounds for identifying, understanding and appreciating the principles, perceptions and 
presuppositions underpinning others’ thought.  Awareness of epistemological differences is a 
precondition for engagement with ideas and such engagement cannot proceed with an 
unlimited range of methodologies.  So with whom discourse is going to be best is a necessary 
criterion for engagement.  For example, in order for the old idea of a fully-informed, rational, 
atomistic agent to be replaced by the complex, fallible, multiply motivated agent requires 
dropping mathematical formalism, which acts as a constraint and perverts concepts.  
Expressing all theory in terms of individual behaviour which can be captured in formal 
mathematics prevents a more realistic model from developing.  The decision as to where 
ecological economics should engage seems rather self-evident when given the choice 
between discourse with close-minded formalists employing outdate behavioural psychology 
to defend an unrealistic position, and open-minded social psychologists or sociologists 
sharing common critiques.  Similarly, those who have called for paradigm shifts and 
revolutions in economics would be better-off, and more consistent, looking to heterodox 
schools of thought rather than pretending there are bridges to be built and fruitful avenues to 
be walked down with orthodox economists who have already heavily invested in the defence 
of their paradigm and the existing power structures in society. 
Some, who are critical of mainstream economics, remain open to having ecological 
economists associate with the old conventional framework without realising this is actually 
detrimental to their desire for the development of a compelling alternative (e.g. Norton and 
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Noonan, 2007).  In ecological economics, association with mainstream economic ideas and 
incorporation of economic formalism have several impacts (Spash, 2009a).  First, extension 
of mainstream thought to the environment means removing specific approaches and concepts 
and marginalising anything heterodox.  For example, Arrow et al. (1996) advocate 
discounting as an efficiency goal with respect to impacts from human induced climate change 
and dismiss the necessity for explicit ethical judgment (see discussion by Spash, 2002a).  
Second, the mix is confusing and involves contradictory elements.  For example, value 
pluralism in ecological economics contrasts with value monism in mainstream economics, 
and the two are incompatible (Norton and Noonan, 2007).  Third, economic imperialism 
means ecological economics is treated as a subfield of orthodox environmental and resource 
economics e.g. the Journal of Economic Literature classification.  Mainstream economics is 
then identified as having watered down or changed interdisciplinary research and heterodox 
concepts in order to make the results fit within and conform to its methodology and ideology 
(Earl, 2005; Lee, 2009).  Fourth, the creation of a clear sense of direction and meaning is 
made far more difficult.  This has been particularly problematic for the journal, but also the 
ecological economics movement more generally.  Some organisations have also adopted the 
title while maintaining an unchanged neoclassical content; the name being used as a 
marketing device (rebranding for superficial product differentiation).  Fifth, and most 
importantly, there will never be progress in knowledge if what we ourselves deem as better 
for understanding environmental and socio-economic problems is swamped by that which we 
openly argue and acknowledge is not. 
4. A Preanalytic Vision for Ecological Economics 
If different methodologies can be seen to follow from different understandings of reality 
(Dow, 2007: 453), then we might ask what is the ecological economists' understanding of 
reality?  A vision seems to be required before we can proceed.  In which case we might, as 
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others have suggested, invoke Schumpeter's (1994 [1954]) concept of vision as the 
"preanalytic cognitive act".  In practice research is likely to build upon the work of our 
predecessors, and so their vision.  Vision as an explicit cognitive act is less common.  
Although, "vision of this kind not only must precede historically the emergence of analytical 
effort in any field but also may re-enter the history of every established science each time 
somebody teaches us to see things in a light of which the source is not to be found in the 
facts, methods, and the results of the pre-existing science" (Schumpeter, 1994 [1954]: 42). 
Such an approach is consistent with a naturalistic tradition in epistemology.  This 
seeks to define the conditions for obtaining reliable information accepting a variety of 
sources e.g. testimony, sense perception, reasoning.  In some forms this can be seen as a 
branch of cognitive psychology and the issues can be addressed by empirical investigation 
(Klein, 2005: 4).  Schumpeter's description of scientific process appears close to such an 
epistemology, although in other respects (explored below) he adopts aspects of logical 
empiricism. 
The Meaning of a Preanalytic Vision 
The role and meaning of a preanalytic vision needs some clarification before looking at what 
form this might take for ecological economics.  What Schumpeter (1994 [1954]) is discussing 
parallels calling for an explicit account of ontological presuppositions.  This may be 
understood as answering a series of questions: what do we understand as being the reality 
with which we are engaging, what are its key features and how do the various elements then 
fit together, what are their properties?  Schumpeter uses Keynes' General Theory, from which 
modern macroeconomics arose, as a prime example of preanalytic vision in practice.  In 
explaining the economic processes of his day Keynes invoked concepts describing the special 
characteristics of his worldview.  Schumpeter (1994 [1954]) notes that there was no question 
of these characteristics being established by antecedent factual research and quotes Keynes 
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(1936: 250): "They are plausibly ascribed to our world, on our general knowledge of 
contemporary human nature". 
This account seems to diverge from the claim by Pasinetti (2005: 841) that Keynes 
said 'when the facts changed he changed his mind' and that Keynesian theory is based upon 
reality and respects facts.  The preanalytic vision also diverges from the Post Keynesian 
concept of stylised facts, first introduced by Kaldor (1961), which are supposed to be 
empirically based reflections of an objective reality.  However, there is no inconsistency here 
as far as Schumpeter is concerned because the role of facts comes once analytical effort starts 
and after conception of the vision.  As Schumpeter (1994 [1954]: 42) states: 
"The first [analytic] task is to verbalize the vision or to conceptualize it in such a way 
that its elements take their places, with names attached to them that facilitate 
recognition and manipulation, in a more or less orderly schema or picture.  But in 
doing so we almost automatically perform two other tasks.  On the one hand, we 
assemble further facts in addition to those perceived already, and learn to distrust 
others that figured in the original vision; on the other hand, the very work of 
constructing the schema or picture will add further relations and concepts to, and in 
general also eliminate others from, the original stock." 
Schumpeter goes on to mention "the surviving elements of the original vision" as being 
subject to more rigorous standards of consistency and adequacy.  Through such a process he 
believes scientific models can be developed and scientific propositions refined.  This is 
strikingly similar to Neurath's repeatedly used analogy of knowledge creation being like 
completely rebuilding a boat while at sea (Uebel, 1996). 
There is a clear divergence between this narrowing and refining and calls for 
methodological pluralism in ecological economics.  Costanza (1996: 12), for example, merely 
states: "Scholars from various disciplines collaborate side-by-side using their own tools and 
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techniques, and in the process develop new theory, tools, and techniques as needed to 
effectively deal with sustainability".  He seems to regard any potential attempts to reject 
content or tools as a violation of the transdisciplinary approach.  Of course this form of 
pragmatism and instrumentalism leaves unanswered how scientific progress is meant to be 
achieved. 
Another missing element from previous contributions to a preanalytic vision for 
ecological economics is the role of ideology.  Schumpeter's exploration of the preanalytic 
vision is embedded within a text concerned about ideological bias.  His aim is to describe the 
role of ideology in forming knowledge, and outline in which areas ideological bias must be 
accepted and where and how it might be excluded.  As explained earlier, removing the 
influence of ideology in science was a key aim of logical empiricism and especially the left 
wing of the Vienna Circle.  However, for Schumpeter, ideology enters at the ground floor and 
the preanalytic vision is ideological by definition.  Yet, he also expresses his belief that "there 
are a large number of phenomena that fail to affect our emotions, one way or the other" 
(Schumpeter, 1994 [1954]: 42).  This allows neutral phenomena to enter which would be 
uncontroversial.  Whether this implies that such phenomena represent an objective reality, 
and underlying factual element, is unclear.15 
Preanalytic Vision and Ontological Presuppositions 
Trying to define a preanalytic vision is not an easy task and especially if the hope is to move 
from ontology through epistemology to methodology.  We might start by asking which other 
approaches we feel have something in common with our still unfocussed picture.  A rare 
attempt along these lines in ecological economics is that by Tacconi (1998).  The need to 
jettison the current form of methodological pluralism, as I have argued, is clear.  Tacconi 
(1998: 103) does cite Norgaard (1989) approvingly and states that a "diversity of paradigms" 
should be maintained, where paradigm is an all encompassing worldview.  However, he 
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argues for the rejection of logical empiricism and for developing a more specific ontology 
and epistemology suited to ecological economics.  In this regard he selects post-normal 
science and strong social constructivism for consideration. 
Strong social constructivism faces some problems in providing a position consistent 
with the preanalytic vision for ecological economists because of its relativist ontology.  As 
Tacconi (1998: 99) notes: "in constructivist ontology being is determined by knowledge.  
Consider the Earth without human beings.  A reality would exist but would not be socially 
constructed".  On this basis Tacconi accepts the existence of a reality independent of human 
cognition but the proposed epistemology appears inadequate for addressing this.  An 
additional, but related, issue is the treatment of biophysical limits.  In social constructivism 
these are subject to a variety of interpretations dependent upon whom is asked, rather than 
being independent constraints on human society.  In addition, Tacconi (1998: 100) is not 
prepared to accept the total lack of independence of observer and observed as proposed by 
social constructivists. 
A foundational issue is then that, unlike other social sciences and most other 
heterodox areas of economics, there is a primary concern for a physical reality and how the 
mix of natural and social sciences should be addressed.  The idea that all reality is socially 
constructed conflicts with the status given to the Laws of Thermodynamics as scientific 
realisations of biophysical reality which are central to the conceptualisation of what is wrong 
with economics (a repeated core concern in ecological economics Daly and Farley, 2004; 
Georgescu-Roegen, 1971; Martinez-Alier, 1990; Munda, 1997).  Yet, at the same time there 
is awareness that we cannot know 'the truth' about that reality (Røpke, 1998: 144), and hence 
the status given to ignorance and social indeterminacy (what Spash, 2002b terms strong 
uncertainty).  That reality can be understood or interpreted in different ways does not mean 
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humans may construct their own reality at will.  The search is for an approach which captures 
both realism and the inadequacy of our ability to know. 
This is presumably why post-normal science has been popular amongst ecological 
economists and especially those who have struggled with finding an epistemology (e.g., 
Munda, 1997; Tacconi, 1998; Ӧzkaynak et al., 2002).16  Post-normal science postulates that 
knowledge about a physical reality can be know through experimentation under restricted 
conditions (broadly in accord with logical empiricism) but that the realm of such knowledge 
creation is limited, and increasingly so.  Thus, as we move away from the controlled 
laboratory, and physics, towards complex interactive global systems, and environmental 
problems, we need a different basis for creating knowledge which involves broad 
participation by the lay public, as an extended peer community (Funtowicz and Ravetz, 1991; 
Funtowicz and Ravetz, 1994).  The problem with this approach, in the current context, is that 
it does not provide a clear theory of science, but is rather an attack on the practice and 
rhetoric of modern science.  There is in part a prescriptive epistemology in that critique, but 
one that leaves unanswered the role of traditional science (i.e. is even restriction to some 
physics laboratory valid, or is all science really post-normal?).  The ontological 
presuppostions are vague but seem to cluster around complex systems theory (Kay et al., 
1999).  Then, as Tacconi (1998) notes, the methodology is under-developed leaving the on-
going task of putting the abstract argument on science quality assurance into practice 
(although some progress in this direction has been made, see van der Sluijs et al., 2005).  So 
post-normal science is struggling with some of the same definitional issues as being 
discussed here for ecological economics (for a review see Turnpenny et al., 2011). 
Some defining ontological features can be drawn from this discussion.  Anyone who 
accepts evolution theory must believe in the existence of a world prior to the emergence of 
humans.  So we may take as given the existence of a non-human reality.  The problem then 
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arises that reality may differ from how humans conceive it and this human perspective on 
reality may change over time.  This raises the philosophical difficulties surrounding a 
correspondence theory of truth, i.e. that a belief is true if and only if it corresponds to reality.  
As Mackie (1970: 332) explains "A correspondence theory of truth is analogous to 
representative realism as a theory of perception, whereas what we want, at least with regards 
to truth, is direct realism".  His answer is a modest proposal: "To say that a statement is true 
is to say that things are as the statement states".  The importance of this lies in enabling 
beliefs or statements to be answerable to how things are, something outside themselves, to 
reality.  Acceptance of this position means we look to reality for confirmation of truth rather 
than, for example, justifying statements on the basis of their current usefulness or coherence 
with other statements.17 
Next we might engage with the challenge from environmental ethics to explore how 
we relate to the non-human world.  I believe, as I think Tacconi does, that ecological 
economists should accept the importance of recognising that a reality without humans is 
meaningful.  This raises questions as to our value commitments to the non-human.  Here the 
last person example is relevant (Sylvan, 2009 [1973]).  That is, does wilfully destroying life 
on Earth matter if you are the last human on the planet, is it wrong?  If ecological economists 
answer in the affirmative, as I believe they should, then they call for a change in the ethics, 
attitudes, values and evaluations of economics.  In contrast, environmental and resource 
economists, for example, would be committed by their theory to accepting the last persons' 
preferences.  So, in terms of a preanalytic vision for ecological economics I think the case is 
strong for including commitment to aspects of realism, empiricism and ethical significance of 
the non-human.  This connects in part with a feminist and Green ideological position 
reflected in a concern to care for and respect Nature beyond the purely instrumental reasons 
for meeting human ends. 
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Then there is the issue of the distinction to be drawn between natural and social 
science investigation or, less dichotomously, between different sciences moving from the 
natural to the social.  For ecological economists, such as Tacconi, the case for the rejection of 
logical empiricism (if narrowly defined) appears clear with regard to the social sciences, but 
for the natural sciences there is an implicit begrudged acceptance of its potential relevance, if 
a highly qualified one.  For example, anyone invoking post-normal science accepts the role of 
normal science, as defined in that literature, in having achieved advances in human 
understanding and for curiosity driven research.  The strong constructivist position is 
therefore rejected.  The qualifier is that normal science is of limited use for addressing 
modern environmental problems because of their specific characteristics, e.g. strong 
uncertainty, high decision stakes. 
Ecological economists struggling with epistemological issues are aware of the need 
for something of a middle path (Baumgartner et al., 2008; Tacconi, 1998).  As Jacobs (1996: 
16) explains, ecological economics requires an approach that "accepts neither the scientific 
reduction of the natural environment to its physical characteristics, nor the constructivist 
position which denies biophysical constraints on social life".  Ecological economics, like 
post-normal science, is trying to steer a course between the postmodern temptation to be 
nihilistic, while avoiding the modernist temptation to claim a single optimal answer or truth 
(Spash, 2002b: 144).  The latter is prevalent in mainstream economics but also common in 
science policy.  The exaggeration of the scope and power of scientific knowledge leads to 
institutionalised censorship of critical opinions (Spash, 2010).  This creates "a vacuum in 
which should exist a vital social discourse about the conditions and boundaries of scientific 
knowledge in relation to moral and social knowledge" (Wynne, 1992: 115).  These 
epistemological concerns raise a broader ontological question as to how we distinguish 
between natural and social realities. 
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One possible aid in developing an ecological economic preanalytic vision of those 
boundaries is to appeal to critical realism,18 which also aims to provide an understanding of 
the interaction between physical and social systems.  Critical realism accepts that we can 
never demonstrate that we have discovered the truth even if we have (fallibilism), but does 
not reject the idea of there being an underlying objective reality.  The description under 
critical realism is of an ordered hierarchy of sciences e.g. molecular sciences, biological 
sciences, social sciences (Collier, 1998b).  There is real (ontological) difference in the strata 
so they are not regarded as just cognitively (epistemologically) convenient.  The real 
distinctions between the strata, and their irreducibility one to another (contra reductionism), 
are used to explain distinctions between the various sciences and the reason for a plurality of 
sciences to exist.  So, for example, everything is governed by the laws of physics, all 
biological entities are physical but not vice versa, so biological sciences are embedded within 
the physical and likewise the social within the biological and the economic within the social.  
This type of embeddedness is one of the key messages ecological economists have been at 
pains to communicate i.e., the economy is embedded in the Natural environment and subject 
to the Laws of Thermodynamics.  Yet, embeddedness should not be confused with 
reductionism.  That elephants are constructed of physical and chemical components does not 
mean elephants' behaviour can be understood by analysis of or reduction to those components 
(Georgescu-Roegen, 2009 [1979]: 109).  Similarly, irreducibility means society is not merely 
a collection of individuals and cannot be understood by simple aggregation on the basis of 
knowledge about individuals.  Such an approach seems more in line with ecological 
economics than other epistemologies.19 
The hierarchical ontology of critical realism contrasts with single level ontologies.  
These come in three forms (Collier, 1998a).  (i) Those claiming parts are mere aspects of 
some whole, so that ultimately there is only the Absolute, of which everything is an aspect.  
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This is the position put forward by Daly and Farley (2004).  (ii) The wholes are mere 
collections of parts, understood only when broken down into their components, which alone 
are ultimately real, e.g. atomistic mechanism.  (iii) Some intermediate level entity (e.g. 
selves) are the only reality, their parts being mere aspects, and the larger entities, which they 
make-up, being mere collections, e.g. some forms of methodological individualism.  The 
critical realist position rejects all these single level ontologies. 
A negative interpretation of the hierarchical division between types of knowledge is 
worth mentioning at this point, due to its practical implications.  This is the belief that truth 
lies in natural science while social sciences are merely a means of communication for that 
truth.  Indeed a few ecologists claiming to have placed economic values on the environment 
have been known to acknowledge their lack of economic training as if to signify that ‘anyone 
can do this stuff’.  Social and economic research is then regarded as instrumentally important 
by such individuals (i.e., pragmatically justified), because politicians and the press listen.  
This denies the importance of non-natural science subjects, or strata, and their independent 
contribution to knowledge.  So we should be clear that the distinction required is not one of 
dichotomous division (social vs. natural), nor ranking (physics is best or hard, economics is 
Queen of the social sciences because it emulates physics, and so on).  This is not a matter of 
superiority, but rather of substance. 
If we pursue contributions to critical realism a bit more, some further insights arise of 
relevance to ecological economics as a policy or issue driven movement.  Social science, 
including economics, can be differentiated on a substantive basis from the natural because it 
involves (contra Hume) an inseparability of facts and values.  In order to explain this I 
borrow from Collier (1998a). 
Social science presents ideas claimed to be true of the object studied.  Unlike the 
natural sciences, the object (i.e. society) includes ideas.  Society can only exist on the basis of 
 30
human agents acting, reproducing and transforming social structure.  Human agents act in 
accordance with ideas (e.g. religions, political ideologies).  This means an account of 
structure requires an account of ideas.  Collier (1998a) gives the example that there can be no 
understanding of the English Civil War without an account of Puritanism (i.e., explanation of 
economic and class structure may be primary but inadequate).  Significant ideas in any 
society include ideas about features of that society.  Understanding social phenomena (e.g. 
unemployment) requires addressing the real structural causes (e.g. financial institutions, 
government policy, world markets) and prevalent ideas.  Those ideas appear as social 
attitudes and political behaviour.  Thus, explanations arising from a social-scientific study 
entail criticism of some ideas in society. 
This means, if the social science is correct then the people it describes who have an 
opposite explanation must be wrong.  Social science criticises part of its object and is 
different from natural science.  For example, that black holes exist is no criticism of them, 
even if we find them unpleasant.  In contrast, as Collier (1998a: 446) explains: 
"To say that some institution causes false beliefs is to criticise it.  Given that (other 
things being equal) it is better to believe what is true than what is false, it is also better 
(other things being equal) that institutions that cause false beliefs should be replaced 
by, or transformed into, those that cause true ones." 
Furthermore, there is often a functional relationship between institutions that cause false 
beliefs and beliefs about those institutions.  False beliefs may be spread in order to preserve 
the institution and its power.  Thus, the rhetoric of the liberating character of ‘free-markets’ 
and benefits of material growth may be used by corporations and governments extracting 
resources, dislocating indigenous populations and creating environmental destruction.  In 
such cases to propound the truth is not just to criticize, but to undermine the institution. 
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"Hence, the production of explanations of social institutions is not only, as a general 
rule, a precondition of criticizing and changing them; sometimes, it is criticizing 
them, and beginning the work of their subversion." (Collier, 1998a: 446) 
Open realisation and acceptance of this position makes ecological economics far more 
radical than orthodox economics, which pretends to give objective value free advice while 
actually supporting the existing institutional structures.  As Söderbaum (2011) points out: 
“Neoclassical economics is science but at the same time ideology.  As ideology, 
neoclassical economics can be described as the ideology of the present capitalist 
system.  Some other institutional arrangement or kind of capitalism appears to be 
needed if we wish to deal constructively with present problems.” 
Being open about these fact-value relationships means ecological economics has a clear role 
in communicating its findings—concerning the character of social and environmental 
problems, the structures behind them and the institutions involved—to those who will 
implement institutional change and address the false beliefs in society.  Indeed this can 
already be witnessed as happening (see Martinez-Alier et al., 2011).  There are then 
fundamental differences in ontological presuppositions between ecological economics and 
the mainstream, leading to very different approaches to the science–policy interface. 
Ecological economics can also be seen as sharing aspects of heterodox economic 
thought in its ontological presuppositions.  For example, in a comparison with Post 
Keynesian economics the state of the world is seen in common as one involving strong 
uncertainty, social indeterminacy, emergent properties and historical dynamic process (Holt 
and Spash, 2009).  In contrast the mainstream can be seen as treating individuals as passive 
agents in a static closed system with an ontology of isolated atomism.  This justifies the 
orthodoxy in their formulation of social reality as typified by regularities so allowing the 
methodology of deductive reasoning and mathematical formalism.  Ecological economics, 
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like other heterodox traditions, accepts the transformative power of human agency with 
emergent properties arising from a dynamic interconnected process of multi-layered social 
interactions.  Modern heterodoxy is then distinguished from the mainstream by allowing 
theory and method to be informed by insights into social reality.  Heterodox economists resist 
the mainstream reformulation of their concepts (e.g. uncertainty, evolutionary developments, 
institutions, motives, ethics) not so much through being committed to them per se, as 
insisting on their possessing specific ontological properties (Lawson, 2006).  My contention 
is that our ontological presuppositions interact with our ideological positions to determine the 
epistemological approaches suitable for adoption, and in turn lead to a methodology suitable 
for ecological economic enquiry. 
5. A Tentative Vision for Ecological Economics 
In order to bring various elements of the argument together I list here, in summary form, 
some of the key aspects of what could form a preanalytic vision for ecological economics.  I 
split this into the ontological, epistemological and methodological.  The list is neither 
comprehensive nor definitive.  In addition I have added a set of ideological beliefs, because, 
as explained, a preanalytic vision is ideological by definition, and mostly ideology remains 
implicit when it should and could usefully be made explicit. 
Ontological Presuppositions 
 An objective reality exists independent of humans; 
 Humans create social reality; 
 Facts about social reality are inseparable from values; 
 Biophysical and social reality are distinct but are interconnected; 
 A hierarchical ontology is accepted in which there is an ordered structure (e.g. 
biophysical, social, economic); 
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 Society and the individual are distinct in that the former cannot be reduce to the latter 
nor the latter merely aggregate to create the former; 
 Complex systems and their interactions create emergent properties and are inherently 
unpredictable; 
 Systems are continually subject to change and interaction. 
Epistemological Claims 
 Our scientific knowledge is always subject to strong uncertainty (i.e., partial 
ignorance, social indeterminacy); 
 We can never prove that we have discovered the truth in our scientific understanding; 
 Understanding and interpreting reality is in part a social process in which knowledge 
is often contested; 
 Knowledge comes in different forms and is not the exclusive domain of the expert; 
indigenous and lay knowledge may challenge or complement expert knowledge; 
 Knowledge is subject to reasoned critique and empirical investigation; 
 Critique can take a variety of forms leading to the need for plural methods; 
 Advancing knowledge requires accepting and rejecting information and being open to 
revising beliefs. 
Methodological Positions 
 Ecological economics is an interdisciplinary approach to understanding; 
 Successful interdisciplinarity requires integration having understood the ontological 
and epistemological basis for cooperation between different bodies of knowledge; 
 Unstructured methodological pluralism is the antithesis of creating knowledge and 
understanding; 
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 Structured methodological pluralism requires working across fields of knowledge 
with those who share a common ontology and epistemology; 
 Creation of mutually understood concepts is necessary for interdisciplinary 
understanding; 
 Methods of evaluation must match the requirements of value pluralism. 
Ideological Beliefs 
 Ethical neutrality should be rejected and ethical positions made explicit; 
 Both human and non-human inhabitants of Earth are morally considerable; 
 Action is required to address gender inequity and inequity between, within and across 
social groups, time periods and spatial dimensions; 
 There are more meaningful aspirations for human existence than hedonism (e.g. 
invoking philosophical concepts such as flourishing, a ‘worthwhile life’, the ‘good-
life’); 
 Restrictions are necessary on population growth and the scale of human activity; 
 Levels of material and energy consumption per capita prevalent in the industrialised 
world are excessive and its social and environmental consequences unacceptable; 
 Opposition is required to the wanton destruction of war and the military-industrial 
complex; 
 We should uphold democratic principles of fairness and justice, including 
international human rights and protection of the innocent from harm; 
 Ecological economics can change the world by creating better understanding of the 
structure of the social and environmental reality in which we live and communicating 
its findings to help achieve that change. 
 Ecological economists should act personally in ways consistent with their 
environmental and social values. 
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6. Conclusions 
Officially, economists follow a rigorous and scientific epistemological approach which has 
been connected to logical empiricism.  From this epistemological basis a methodology of 
deduction in economics has developed.  This sets a procedure for gaining knowledge on the 
basis of theory development leading to hypothesis which are meant to be tested by 
observation resulting in confirmation or falsification.  A summary of the key failures in 
mainstream economics which have been outlined is that (i) economists do not actually follow 
their supposed epistemology, (ii) their approach lacks an explicit ontology, (iii) the 
philosophy of science from which this approach is derived has been caricatured in a single 
form when it was a diverse and contested body of work. 
The continued support for mathematical formalism and quantification as providing the 
sole means to scientific rigour and validity is damaging to an alternative vision for ecological 
economics.  The main reason Norgaard made his, somewhat flawed, case for pluralism 
appears to have been his concern that ecological economics in its infancy should avoid 
domination by a prescriptive epistemology, and so lose the opportunity to develop and 
experiment with other approaches.  After over two decades the time for a more progressive 
stance on the philosophy of science appropriate for ecological economics is overdue.  
Ecological economics has an empirical aspect and some possible intellectual roots amongst 
members of the left Vienna Circle.  That mainstream economics is not following logical 
empiricism seems more of a problem than the claim that it is following some form of highly 
restrictive positivism.  Ecological economics is, and should be in part, an empirically based 
subject, but the form of that empiricism needs development and should not be restricted to a 
narrow, dogmatic, anti-pluralist, prescriptive caricature, nor based upon appeals to the most 
popular methodology.  There seems no hope for progress if all that is done is to follow a 
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rejected methodology on the grounds that it is believed to be dominant amongst those whom 
one opposes. 
This paper is a first tentative step in a project aiming at some coherence as we move 
from ontology to method.  Pursuit of that project should aid the avoidance of holding totally 
contradictory positions simultaneously.  The argument put forward denies the claim that 
everything can be included and that failing to include all other disciplines and their tools in an 
indiscriminate manner is paramount to an ‘intellectual turf war’.  Ecological economics is not 
free from ontological or epistemological positions which have methodological implications.  
The aim here has been to explore these issues and their relevance and to show we can start to 
formulate a substantively different vision from that of orthodox economics as a school of 
thought. 
In criticising unstructured and uncritical pluralism (with respect to methodology) my 
aim has been to point out that knowledge creation requires refining and rejecting information 
and approaches.  This does not mean that all pluralism is to be thrown out.  Rather, grounds 
for making pluralism meaningful are required and that implies finding common ground for 
interaction and communication using common concepts.  I have argued that those 
commonalities lie between ecological economics and heterodox economic schools of thought.  
Neoclassical approaches are in fact then detrimental to developing an alternative economic 
vision and conflict with epistemological progress.  If people wish to undertake such 
approaches they should do so elsewhere, and so free ecological economics from having to 
pretend to agree with a series of orthodox fallacies, including: the pretence that there is no 
biophysical reality imposing limits and economics can be value free.  Ecological economics 
can either develop a more rigorous approach and establish a theoretical structure or become 
increasingly eclectic, unfocussed and irrelevant.  Ecological economics as a conservative 
movement is an unnecessary waste of time, merely shadowing environmental and resource 
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economics.  Ecological economics as a radical movement is required today, more than ever, 
in order to criticise and change the social organisations and institutions that spread false 
beliefs about economic, social and environmental reality. 
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Appendix I: The Vienna Circle and Logical Empiricism 
Logical empiricism was most strongly developed due to meetings held over about three 
decades at the start of the 1900s by a group of intellectuals, referred to as the Vienna Circle.  
The original group started meeting in 1907.  An interlude occurred around the First World 
War.  The second phase and height of development was in the interwar period.  Nazi support 
and its eventual dominance in Austria caused the Circle to end its meetings, with Neurath 
going into exile in England (where he died in 1945) and many others settling in America (e.g. 
Carnap, Frank).  As a result ideas continued development in America during the 1950s and 
1960s.  As an active research field in philosophy of science the movement was finally over 
by 1970 (Creath, 2011).  However, while few may claim to be logical empiricists today many 
philosophers of science were trained in this mode of thought and pursue its projects.  It has 
also had a much wider influence in how science has been and continues to be perceived. 
The original aim was to pursue the ideas of physicist Ernst Mach.  The founding 
group—Otto Neurath, Hans Hahn and Philipp Frank—was socialist/Marxist in orientation 
and with the later addition of Rudolph Carnap is now referred to as the left wing of the 
Vienna Circle.  When the group was expanded in the 1920s a more conservative wing was 
added, led by Moritz Schlick (Uebel, 2011).  Hans Reichenbach has been cited as 
representing a right wing (Howard, 2009: 200).  Moritz Schlick was not the founder as 
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claimed by Caldwell (1980), but rather chaired sessions of the Verein Ernst Mach (Ernst 
Mach Society) from 1922 after having been invited to join by Hans Hahn.  As this indicates, 
the Circle had some complex dynamics and internal divisions.  There was considerable 
variety and change over time in ideas and a broad membership outside the core of people who 
associated with or attended Circle meetings, discussions and lectures in Vienna in the 1920s 
and 1930s.  The Circle was not closed to debating or developing its ideas.  Before the 
movement in Europe disintegrated and dispersed, members of the Circle had recognised most 
of the problems later cited as criticisms. 
The philosophical underpinnings for a radical form of Marxian socialism which had 
been part of the left wing did not sit well under American McCarthyism.  After moving to the 
United States both Carnap and Frank were under observation by Hoover's FBI.  More 
generally, the socialist and explicit political aspect disappeared from logical empiricism.  
Today the poor state of science policy debate in the USA evidences the legacy of 
McCarthyism on American philosophers of science and their fear of entering the public 
policy debate—having been exiled to the icy slopes of logic (Howard, 2000, 2009; Reisch, 
2005). 
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1 This position is left rather unexplained with merely a reference to a book by C. S. Lewis, 
the Christian apologist.  God is mentioned as a possible ultimate end and so source of 
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objective value.  There then almost seems to be an implicit appeal to Natural Law behind 
this. 
2 The more specific entry is "Q57 - Ecological Economics: Ecosystem Services; Biodiversity 
Conservation; Bioeconomics; Industrial Ecology". 
3 For a brief overview of the historical school see Sandelin (2008: 64-78). 
4 For example, the claim that logical positivism has been dominant in science for several 
centuries conflates it with earlier forms of positivism.  The statement that it employs 
falsification as a criterion of validity is incorrect, as discussed below.  Also the approach is 
not, as he claims, an active research area today, nor even a dominant epistemology in 
philosophy of science. 
5 Caldwell (1980; 1994) has provided influential, detailed accounts but ones that are 
misleading in representing the Circle as a unfied and stable movement.  This neglects the 
divisions between the left and right wings of the Circle.  Recognising this division is 
potentially important for ecological economics (O'Neill, 2004).  Note, Caldwell has strong 
sympathies with Hayek, a free market liberal and Austrian economist.  Hayek opposed and 
attacked Neurath in the debate over the need for non-monetary measures in economic 
choice—the socialist calcuation debate. 
6 Carnap is noted to have defended logical and methodological pluralism (Creath, 2011), and 
Neurath in addition political and social pluralism (O'Neill, 2003). 
7 Interestingly Common and Stagl (2005) support a verificationist account of knowledge 
acquisition with a fact based (value free) objective economic science seeking to determine 
what is true from what is false. 
8 Neurath's work directly informed the development of the sociology of science.  For 
example, Howard (2000: footnote 29) references the acknowledgment of Neurath by Quine. 
9 Similarly, Caldwell (1980) has added to this caricature by relying on the analytical 
philosophical ideas of the exiles in America (e.g. Carnap) to the exclusion of competing 
ideas.  In this respect, account must be taken of the influence McCarthyism had on science-
policy in the USA and in restricting the political engagement of the exiles work (see 
Appendix I). 
10 I follow the convention used by Norton (2011) and Callicott et al. (2011) of using a capital 
'P' for this philosophical school and a lower case 'p' if referring to pragmatism in common 
usage (i.e., dealing with things in a way that is based upon practical rather than theoretical 
considerations).  Being, lower case, pragmatic is then regarded as being practical about how 
best to proceed or what to hold as true.  Philosophical, capitalised, Pragmatism is an 
approach that assess the truth of beliefs in terms of their practical and instrumental 
applicability.  There is much variety and dispute within Pragmatism.  While Bromley is a 
self proclaimed American Pragmatist, the likes of Norgaard and Costanza can be regarded 
as being pragmatic in common terminology.  Elsewhere I have used the later form in the 
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term “new environmental pragmatism” to characterise the pragmatic turn in 
environmentalism and ecological economics (Spash, 2009c). 
11 Similarly, while logical empiricists of the Vienna Circle denied the meaningfulness of 
ontological questions, in scientific enquiry, they in fact started from a basis in the 
preoccupations of physicists and mathematicians; so their view of reality appears implicitly 
based upon some specific ontological preconditions. 
12 Other arguments he puts forward concern plural methods not variety in methodology, and 
as a result confuse different conceptual levels and do not support accepting a plurality of 
methodologies.  Methods should be in-line with epistemological understanding and can 
therefore be inclusive of considerable variety if this is appropriate to the theory of 
knowledge creation being pursued.  In addition, his arguments confuse methodological 
pluralism with value pluralism.  Rejecting the former does not necessitate losing the latter 
and so value pluralism can exist independently of the position on methodological pluralism. 
13 Those who view scientific facts as social constructions deny that the goal of science is to 
find facts.  As Steup (2010) explains: "Such constructivism, if weak, asserts the 
epistemological claim that scientific theories are laden with social, cultural, and historical 
presuppositions and biases; if strong, it asserts the metaphysical claim that truth and reality 
are themselves socially constructed." 
14 A useful aspect of their discussion is to highlight the role of concepts, which is something 
Kapp (1961) also recognised as a key approach for communication and integration if 
interdisciplinary work is to progress (see Spash, 2012). 
15 The other area where ideology is believed potentially absent is in the rules of procedure for 
conducting analytical research.  Here something of a verificationist approach seems to be 
behind the text.  Schumpeter (1994 [1954]) talks of new facts accumulating, leading to new 
concepts and relations being formulated and these either verifying or destroying ideological 
positions.  This is consistent with his empiricism, both of which seem to hold elements of 
early Vienna Circle reasoning. 
16 Silva and Teixeira (2011) claim that "ecological economics is evolving unambiguously 
towards a post-normal science".  This seems to misinterpret both post-normal science and 
their data.  For example, the increase of abstract mathematical formalism in the journal, 
which they note and misleading associate with rigour, is hardly consistent with this.  
Neither is the spread of monetary valuation or much else that they present.  For an 
informative overview of the content and meaning of post-normal science see Turnpenny, 
Jones and Lorenzoni (2011). 
17 Mackie (1970: 332) notes that a correspondence theory stands opposed to such "sceptical 
or otherwise evasive theories as the coherence theory and pragmatist theory".  The former 
requires coherence amongst statements and is associated with logical empiricists who 
thought comparing statements with facts was metaphysics.  A pragmatist theory regards 
statements as useful, e.g. scientific theories are open to refutation or change but may still 
enable us to achieve certain tasks such as building and flying aeroplanes. 
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18 I have found only two references to such a potential link by ecological economists.  One 
was in a footnote to a book chapter by Røpke (1998: 144) and the other a brief mention in 
the book on institutions and the environment by Vatn (2005: 55-56). 
19 For example, Bromley (2008) in recommending his personal form of American 
Pragmatism to ecological economists states that: "[P]ragmatists regard truth as a belief—a 
warranted assertion—that it is no longer reasonable to doubt.  Truth is not a property of 
objects or events."  He then appears to argue that truth and so reality is just a set of beliefs 
captured in sentences.  While fallibilism seems generally accepted, I do not believe the 
approach Bromley advocates actually addresses the ontological presuppositions of 
ecological economics. 
